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Article
Geopolitical assemblages
and complexity
Jason Dittmer
University College London, UK
Abstract
This article proposes a framework for considering materiality in the field of geopolitics: assemblage and
complexity theories. Drawing on literatures beyond the field to imagine a posthuman geopolitics, this article
argues for a relational ontology that emphasizes the complex interactions among the elements of an
assemblage. These interactions produce emergent effects which themselves reshape the assemblage’s
elements. This has implications for understandings of agency, subjectivity, and systemic change. The article
concludes by highlighting the methodological and ethical challenges that such a project would face.
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I Rethinking the material
in geopolitics
Geopolitics is a field of study that has struggled
with the topic of materiality. Early geopolitics
was explicitly materialist in its adherence to
environmental determinism, viewing the eternal
dynamics of international relations as following
from the permanence of landscape and climate.
Understanding the strategic importance or limita-
tions of a given territory was understood as
advantaging one state in their competition with
others (e.g. Mackinder, 1904; Whittlesey,
1939). Post-SecondWorldWar geopoliticsmain-
tained this emphasis (Cohen, 1973), with some
efforts to model these dynamics better through
abstraction and quantification (O’Sullivan,
1982). In this formulation geopolitics is the out-
come of material concerns, such as the role of
mountains in disrupting ‘force fields’ through
which power is projected from national capi-
tals. Another type of materialism emerged in
the 1970s with the engagement of political
geography with world systems theory (Flint,
2012; Taylor, 1982), which sees geopolitics as
the global struggle to control the distribution
of material resources, including natural
resources and human labor. This focus on the
materiality of capitalism has been maintained
to the present in a consistent strand of research
(Cowen and Smith, 2009; Mercille, 2008).
Beginning in the early 1990s, however, the
project of critical geopolitics pushed back against
this materialism, emphasizing textual discourse
as part of a new geopolitical ontology (see Kelly,
2006). The past century of geopolitical thinking
in the service of empire and superpower was
thoroughly analyzed, critiqued, and located
within specific contexts and biographies (Bassin,
1987; Dodds and Atkinson, 2000; Kearns, 2009;
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O´ Tuathail, 1996; Smith, 2004), with geography
not found in the material landscape or the flows
of capital but in the representations of the mate-
rial world. Of course, this was not a complete
dematerialization; some scholars paid attention
to the material circulation of the texts themselves
(Dittmer and Dodds, 2008; Dodds, 2006), while
Dalby (1992, 1993, 2002, 2007, 2009) main-
tained a consistent interest in the relationship
between militarism and environmental security
(see also Grove, 2010). A wide array of material-
ities has been introduced alongside these in
recent years, from urban infrastructure and
design (Graham, 2004, 2009) to disease and pub-
lic health (Ingram, 2005, 2008) and affect and
anticipation (Anderson, 2010; Anderson and
Adey, 2011). Of course, alongside these increas-
ingly sophisticated accounts of materiality there
remain accounts written by disciplinary outsiders
that maintain the crude environmental determin-
ism of early geopolitics (Dolman, 2001; Kaplan,
2012).
Aversion to the early environmental determin-
ism of geopolitics has embedded a healthy
skepticism about the role of the material in geo-
political thought, although clearly there have
been many ways to incorporate materiality over
the years. There is, as Tolia-Kelly (2011) notes
in her recent review, always the risk of reducing
materiality to surface – of gesturing to it while
refusing to consider it in a sustained and sensitive
fashion. In this paper I draw from recent work in
other parts of human geography (especially cul-
tural, urban, and environmental geography) and
beyond (science and technology studies, interna-
tional relations, political theory, and philosophy,
among others) to offer a way forward (assem-
blage and complexity theory) that enables us not
so much to pick our way through old minefields
such as environmental determinism, structure/
agency, and scale as to sidestep them altogether.
Further, the approach that I advocate connects
with arguments for geopolitics as everyday prac-
tice (Dittmer and Gray, 2010; Sharp, 2007) and
as a local, bottom-up set of processes that need
to be studied as such – via disaggregation and
attention to both specific sites and events (O´
Tuathail, 2010; see also Shaw, 2012). Finally,
this approach also provides a language for under-
standing and engendering progressive geopoliti-
cal change, speaking to a common critique
coming from feminist geopolitics (Hyndman,
2001).
This paper proceeds in four sections. In the
first, I outline assemblage theory, highlighting
areas where extant work in geopolitics points
towards assemblages and importing ideas and
concepts where there are few antecedents.
Beyond this outline, I argue that assemblages
allow for a posthuman turn in geopolitics, incor-
porating animals, ‘nature’, and other objects
into our understandings of the geopolitical.
Further, I argue that assemblage embeds a rela-
tional ontology that dissolves the macro/micro
scalar tensions at the heart of geopolitics. In the
second section, I introduce complexity theory,
which has a different trajectory in human geo-
graphy to assemblage theory but still owes its
recent resurgence to the rise of assemblage
thinking. Beyond tracing this trajectory, I argue
that complexity theory enables us to incorporate
the environment and materiality into geopoliti-
cal analyses of change without lapsing into any
of the determinism that plagues early geopoliti-
cal thought (and its neoclassical variants – see
Megoran, 2010). The third section of this article
describes the implications of this argument for
the role of the subject in geopolitical thought.
In the final section, I consider the implications
of thinking geopolitics through assemblage and
complexity theory, with an emphasis on ethics
and methodology.
II Assemblage theory
There is a range of ways of ‘thinking assem-
blage’, eachwith different lineages and emphases
(see Robbins and Marks, 2009, for a typology).
Assemblage theory, as taken up in this review,
is derived from the work of Deleuze and Guattari
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(1987), which was later systematized by
DeLanda (2006). Assemblages can be defined
as ‘wholes characterised by relations of exterior-
ity’ (DeLanda, 2006: 10; for an extended discus-
sion, see Anderson et al., 2012). These relations
of exteriority mean that component parts of a
whole cannot be reduced to their function within
that whole, and indeed they can be parts of multi-
ple wholes at any given moment. The parts are
nevertheless shaped by their interactions within
assemblages, and indeed it is the capacities,
rather than theproperties, of component parts that
are most relevant in understanding resultant
assemblages. While the properties of a material
are relatively finite, its capacities are infinite
because they are the result of interaction with
an infinite set of other components.
Such an approach to geopolitics is a key
corrective to early German geopolitical theories
that reduced the nation state to a body composed
of its material organs, such as its sovereign (insti-
tutions and regime type), population (labor and
military power), or natural resources (fertile land,
minerals, petroleum, etc.). This metaphor of the
organism, central to much political theory of the
Enlightenment (Rasmussen and Brown, 2005),
invested the body with relations of interiority
rather than those of exteriority (Durkheim,
1915). For instance, Ratzel’s organic theory of
the state envisioned the state as deriving its
power and vitality from its farmland and popula-
tion resources (Bassin, 1987; Smith, 1980).
Functionalist accounts such as this reduce a
totality, such as the state, to the sum of its parts,
without considering how those relationships are
‘contingently obligatory’ rather than ‘logically
necessary’ (DeLanda, 2006: 11). Because of the
contingency of the evolving body, an organism is
more properly understood as an assemblage than
as the archetype of functionalism. Crucially, not
only is the organismal body an assemblage
(Whatmore, 1997), but it is a component part
of other geopolitical assemblages, such as the
state, a mob, or a multiplayer networked video
game: ‘The components of social assemblages
playing a material role vary widely, but at the
very least involve a set of human bodies properly
oriented (physically or psychologically) towards
each other’ (DeLanda, 2006: 12).
While reconsidering the role of materiality in
geopolitical assemblages is important, there are
other roles to be played in the composition of
assemblage. DeLanda argues that components
of an assemblage can be defined on three axes:
material/expressive, territorializing/deterritoria-
lizing, and coding/decoding. Any assemblage,
composed of a heterogeneous mixture of consti-
tuent parts, will have a range of material and
expressive components at any given time: ‘These
roles are variable andmay occur in mixtures, that
is, a given component may play a mixture of
material and expressive roles by exercising
different sets of capacities’ (DeLanda, 2006:
12). A geopolitical example might be an inter-
state border; a border has various component
parts that contribute varying material properties,
such as a wall or the passport that licenses pas-
sage. Expressive components might include the
biometric information contained in the passport
or the legislation legitimating detention of sus-
pected illegal immigrants (Coleman, 2009). As
Deleuze and Guattari put it:
There is no longer a tripartite division between a
field of reality (the world) and the field of repre-
sentation (the book) and the field of subjectivity
(the author). Rather, an assemblage establishes
connections between certain multiplicities drawn
from each of these orders. (Deleuze and Guattari,
1987: 25)
The axis of territorialization/deterritorialization
refers to the relative delineation of the assem-
blage from its neighbors. As with the material/
expressive axis, any component can be working
to territorialize the assemblage at any given
moment, and soon thereafter exercise a capacity
to deterritorialize it. To continue the example of
the border, we might consider the biometric
technologies that enable rapid transit of the bor-
der to be both deterritorializing in that they
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make indistinct what is and is not part of the bor-
der (Amoore, 2006) and yet reterritorializing in
that they can make the border entirely tangible
for one caught up in their algorithms.
One way in which social assemblages
become (de)territorialized is through coding/
decoding: ‘processes which consolidate and
rigidify the identity of the assemblage or, on the
contrary, allow the assemblage a certain latitude
for more flexible operation while benefitting
from generic or linguistic resources’ (DeLanda,
2006: 19). This process has been known in crit-
ical geopolitics as discourse; however, in this
more materialist, embodied form of geopolitics
we must also include non-linguistic forms of
coding, such as DNA. A final iteration of the
border example will suffice – scholars of critical
geopolitics have long noted that borders are
uneven in their application, interacting with the
coding of various bodies according to discursive
logics of inclusion and exclusion (Popescu,
2011). Given that components of the assem-
blage come and go, and are constantly interact-
ing with one another in ways that produce new
capabilities, it is clear that assemblages are con-
stantly in process, even when they seem stable
and coherent (Anderson and McFarlane, 2011).
Assemblages are composed of more than just
the material, however. The dynamism of assem-
blages means that a range of contingent futures is
always possible. These ‘lines of flight’ (as
Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, refer to them) are
potentials inherent to anymoment. However, just
because they are unactualized does not mean that
they are not real, nor incapable of impacting on
the present. Indeed, recent work on anticipation
emphasizes the way in which futures are brought
into the present in order to remake the present –
making these futures more or less likely (e.g.
Anderson, 2010). These virtual presences are
immaterial but nevertheless can be made present
and acted upon.
There are two features of the assemblage
approach that I would like to draw out here. First
is its commitment to a posthuman geopolitics.
The early excesses of environmental determin-
ism in geopolitics led to a complete disavowal
of the role of environmental and biological mate-
riality in geopolitical causation (for a more com-
plete analysis, see Stallins, 2012). This traumatic
experience, along with broader philosophical
currents, embedded a profound humanism in our
conception of politics. Alternative visions can
today be found in non-representational concep-
tions of politics as always contextualized by
material environments that pave the way for con-
scious thought and political decision-making.
However, the material dimension of politics can
also be found, expressed in quite different terms,
by work in political ecology that has remained at
the fringes of geopolitical thought. This work has
emphasized the material properties of various
natures (Le Billon, 2001), and has argued for the
interrelationship of physical systems and human
politics (Dalby, 2009). A more-than-human geo-
politics has thus already begun to take root (if
you will pardon the pun) in analyses of the
mutual interactions of weeds and the War on
Terror (Barker, 2010), the intersection of territor-
ial airspace and atmospheric flows (Adey et al.,
2011; Williams, 2010), and the proliferation of
politicized geological knowledges around oil
pipelines (Barry, 2013). This work shares a
healthy skepticism about the primacy of the
human in political matters, because of either the
inherent vitalism of living things or the vibrancy
of materials. As Bennett (2010: 112) puts it,
‘materiality is a rubric that tends to horizontalize
the relations between humans, biota and abiota’
(see also Meehan et al., 2013).
The dissolution of the nature/culture divide
(Latour, 1993) has profound implications for
geopolitics that have yet to be explored (see, for
example, Anderson, 1997). A posthuman geopo-
litics rooted in assemblage theory enables agency
to be located in animals (Hobson, 2007; Wolch
and Emel, 1998), objects (Braun and Whatmore,
2010), and environments (Mitchell, 2002). Of
crucial importance to this move is that it entails
no determinism at all. Rather, because power is
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enacted through assemblage, it must be
understood as distributed among the various
components of that assemblage, human and
non-human. That is to say, the properties and
capabilities of non-human components of an
assemblage shape outcomes in highly contingent
ways (Whatmore, 2002). As Latour says:
there might exist many metaphysical shades
between full causality and sheer inexistence. In
addition to ‘determining’ and serving as a ‘back-
drop for human action’, things might authorise,
allow, afford, encourage, permit, suggest, influ-
ence, block, render possible, forbid, and so on.
(Latour, 2005: 72)
Of course, humans differ from (most) non-
human components in that they exercise inten-
tionality and reflexivity, and this is crucial to any
analysis. However, it would be a mistake to see
this as a fundamental difference, as this would
disavow the embodied materiality of humanity
that links us to the rest of the world (Protevi,
2009).
The second feature of an assemblage approach
to geopolitics that I would like to draw out here is
its commitment to a relational ontology. The
scale debates of the past 15 years were sparked
by questions about the rescaling of governance
in an era of globalization, and the contestation
of this frame by feminist scholars (Delaney and
Leitner, 1997; Kurtz, 2003; Marston, 2000).
While there has been no straightforward resolu-
tion to these debates, they have undoubtedly
advanced the cause of relational ontologies, both
within political geography (Painter, 2010) and in
related fields (Allen, 2004, 2009; Marston et al.,
2005). These ontologies take a range of forms,
but can be understood to emphasize both specific
sites and the relationships between them, a
perspective shared by feminist and other scholars
(Katz, 2001; McFarlane, 2009).
Relational ontologies are particularly impor-
tant to scholars of non-representational theory,
who posit bodies always in relation not only
with one another but with other things:
Affect is presented as an ontological layer of embo-
died existence, delimited by reference to the purely
formal relationship of the capacity to be affected
and to affect. In this presentation, affect is doubly
located: in the relational in-between of fields of
interaction; and layered below the level of minded,
intentional consciousness. (Barnett, 2008: 188)
This concern with the mediation of affects has
become an object of study within the previously
avowedly representational popular geopolitics
(Carter andMcCormack, 2006, 2010), with anal-
yses slowly shifting to incorporate understand-
ings of various media networks (such as the
broadband network on which the internet and
video games now rely and the cinematic distribu-
tion network on which Hollywood relies) as
infrastructures of affect (Dittmer, 2011; Dittmer
and Gray, 2010; Shaw and Warf, 2009). In short,
recent work in geopolitics (and elsewhere) has
emphasized the scale of everyday life, albeit an
everyday life that is produced through its translo-
cal commitments (Jeffrey, 2013; Painter, 2006).
Engagements such as this usefully situate scho-
lars in critical geopolitics for a close examination
of how components of an assemblage are specif-
ically articulated in relation to one another, a key
spatial dynamic of assemblage. Assemblage
thinking ‘foregrounds the ways in which social/
political processes are generated through rela-
tions between sites, rather than configured
through ‘‘internal relations’’ in sites’ (Feather-
stone, 2011: 140).
Work in geopolitics has often struggled to
negotiate the macro/micro divide. ‘Traditional’
geopolitics has tended to favor the authority of
the global scale, seeing states’ actions as shaped
by their geographic situation, the capitalist sys-
tem, and/or the global distribution of power.
To the extent that individuals’ agency is
acknowledged, it tends to be that of statesper-
sons and other elites. Critical geopolitics, while
contrarian to much of the geopolitical tradition,
has been criticized by feminist scholars for
maintaining this elite-centric view of agency as
constituted only at the largest scales (Dowler
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and Sharp, 2001; Hyndman, 2001). Scholars of
feminist geopolitics have argued that the long-
standing emphasis in critical geopolitics on
discourse has dematerialized geopolitics, leav-
ing it the domain of (masculine) elites whomake
pronouncementswhich scholars then study. This
critique of elite agency has been taken up by
scholars writing in other traditions as well (Ditt-
mer and Dodds, 2008;Mu¨ller, 2008), and cumu-
latively it can be said that an interest in the
embodied agent has emerged. This ‘body’ is of
course highly differentiated, both via sexual and
a range of other differences (Colls, 2012), and
may only be understandable in relation to other
bodies. This latter position has been staked out
by non-representational theorists (Pile, 2010),
and refers to the transpersonal nature of affects
which are understood to condition our subjectiv-
ities (Connolly, 2002). These recent develop-
ments, which emphasize the excess of agency
in the human body, can be supplemented by the
posthumanism of assemblage theory. When
the anthropocentrism of geopolitical thought
(whether critical or otherwise) is replaced with
a wider notion of the political, we are left with
a flat ontologywhereby so-called ‘macro’ scales
emerge out of interactions occurring at relatively
‘micro’ scales (Escobar, 2007). This resonates
with, for example, criticisms of the 2003 Iraq
invasion as the product of a parochial group of
elites who organized ‘stovepipes’ to bring raw
intelligence from the field directly to the Oval
Office. As Latour argues in the context of
actor-network theory:
Macro no longer describes a wider or a larger site
in which the micro would be embedded like some
Russian Matroyoshka doll, but another equally
local, equally micro place, which is connected
to many others through some medium transport-
ing specific types of traces. (Latour, 2005: 176)
The production of assemblage is thus a ‘bottom-
up’ process. For example, consciousness, that
which distinguishes human agency in traditional
political thought, is the emergent effect of a
human body’s assemblage – an effect that can
dissipate when that assemblage receives a right
hook across the jaw, interrupting certain relations
among bodily organs and systems. However,
with this example, of both the concept of emer-
gence and the possibility of interrupting or
changing the relations of assemblage, it becomes
crucial to introduce complexity theory.
III Complexity theory
Complexity theory first experienced a flurry of
interest in human geography in the late 1990s
as it was imported from the physical and envi-
ronmental sciences (Thrift, 1999); it also had a
brief moment in International Relations (Jervis,
1997). Manson (2001: 405) argues that there are
three major divisions in complexity research:
algorithmic complexity, deterministic complex-
ity, and aggregate complexity. Of these, aggre-
gate complexity offers the greatest opportunity
for geopolitical scholarship, referring to the
study of ‘how individual elements work in
concert to create systems with complex beha-
vior’. This is not merely to say that systems are
complicated. Rather, complexity refers to an
understanding of systems as always dynamic
and interacting in ways that defy attempts to
model them. Small deviations or mutations at
the micro scale can resonate with other events
and lead to new, unexpected outcomes.
Complexity theory was criticized for being
both too abstract and general to be of use (in that
it can be applied to virtually all physical and
social systems) or, paradoxically, too specific
to produce general conclusions (in that each
complex system is treated as a singularity).
However, Manson and O’Sullivan (2006: 679)
argue that the former criticism can be countered
by the application of careful empirical research
in specific contexts, a long-standing tradition
among ‘space and place researchers [who] are
familiar with the problems of representing pro-
cesses that vary in several dimensions and
thereby call for nuanced specificity combined
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with generalization’. Manson and O’Sullivan
(2006: 681) dismiss the latter criticismwith refer-
ence to the same strength of geographic research:
‘However difficult it may be to generalize from
the particular, anticipating the particular from
the general is harder still. No amount of abstract
theorizing can replace well-founded empirical
investigation of phenomena in real-world set-
tings’ (for a geopolitical parallel, see O´ Tuathail,
2003b; O´ Tuathail and Dahlman, 2011). Despite
these criticisms, complexity theory never disap-
peared, remaining visible in environmental and
urban geography through to the present (Batty,
2005; Malanson et al., 2006; Phillips, 2004;
Portugali, 2006; Stallins, 2006; Thrift, 2005).
Despite this early (if small) boom among
human geographers, it is possible that complex-
ity theory would fade as many intellectual fash-
ions do. However, it received a boost from the
rise of assemblage theory in the latter 2000s, with
which it shares many similarities. For instance,
both complex systems and assemblages are open
to outside influences, as they are both defined by
relations of exteriority. Also, both complex
systems and assemblages are defined by their
interactions; therefore both exceed the ‘sum of
their parts’. Third, they are historical in nature –
each individual assemblage and complex
system embeds its past in its compositional rela-
tionships: ‘A system ‘‘remembers’’ through the
persistence of internal structure . . . Components
and sub-systems with the capacity to accommo-
date the influx of energy, matter, and information
from the environment will grow’ (Manson, 2001:
410). This is true at multiple timescales: the com-
plex system/assemblage of the human body bears
witness to our evolutionary history (one might
consider the appendix, for example) as well as
short-term embodied memory (such as when you
instinctively pull back from the stove that has
burned you before). In these competing temporal-
ities, we glimpse:
multiple layers of the past resonat[ing] with things
unfolding in the current situation, sometimes
issuing something new as if from nowhere. The
new is ushered into being through a process that
exceeds rational calculation or the derivation of
practical implications from universal principles.
(Connolly, 2010: 69)
The concept of emergence relies, after all, on a
sense of the world as constantly becoming (Pri-
gogine, 1980). The congruence of complexity
theory and assemblage theory is important not
only because it has infused complexity theory
with currency, but also because complexity
theory provides a conceptual language for under-
standing how assemblages work over time.
Complexity theory can be seen to have antece-
dents in general systems theory, which remains
influential in political geography and interna-
tional relations to this day. There is of course the
already-mentioned literature on world systems
theory (Flint, 2012; Taylor, 1982). There is also
a French variant of systems thought, the most
recent of which attempts to model geopolitics
in five dimensions: physical geography, demo-
graphy, state action, globalizing economics, and
globalizing culture (Dussouy, 2010). A similar
initiative to bring together the various human and
physical dimensions of world politics can be seen
in the discipline of International Relations
(Buzan and Little, 2000). Systems thought
remains a minority concern in Anglophone
geopolitics, but these frameworks remind geo-
political scholars of the vast range of material
and immaterial factors that shape the political
world, many of which remain outside of cur-
rent analyses:
By juxtaposing the environmental, the economic,
the demographic, the strategic, and the cultural/
ideological, [systems thought] encourages explo-
ration of matters that are just beginning to attract
attention of geopolitical scholars, but that have
great potential as areas of significant inquiry
(e.g. the geopolitical implications of environmen-
tal change). (Murphy, 2010: 155)
Complexity theory retains the anti-reductionist
aims of systems theory, but has key differences
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(Manson, 2001). First, rather than assuming that
systems are at equilibrium under most circum-
stances, complexity theory assumes constant,
non-linear change with relations among ele-
ments of the system differing qualitatively over
time. Second, complexity theory emphasizes
that complex behavior can be produced out of
relatively simple relations among elements of
the system. Finally, complexity theory assumes
that systems are open rather than closed, and are
therefore shaped by neighboring systems.
Systems defined by complexity are understood
as self-organizing; this does not refer to being
directed by a self (although such reflexive beha-
vior is possible following the emergence of a self),
but rather it indicates that order can come from
disorder without any form of governance. To
maintain this order, complex systems tend to
become more complex rather than less as they
accommodate their environments. However, they
can suddenly dissipate (deterritorialize, in Deleu-
zean/DeLandan terms) before taking on a new
structure, perhapswith a completelydifferent cod-
ing. For instance, Manson (2001) gives the exam-
ple of the industrial revolution, which dissipated
the old economy and geopolitics before reterritor-
ializing them in new forms. However, what really
marks off complexity theory off is a concept
against which we have brushed up several times
thus far: emergence. Indeed, Thrift (1999: 33)
refers to complexity theory as ‘the idea of a sci-
ence of holistic emergent order’. Emergence
refers to ‘qualities that are not analytically tract-
able from the attributes of internal components’
(Manson, 2001: 410), but that instead ‘can now
be explained as an effect of the causal interactions
between its component parts’ (DeLanda, 2011: 3).
Recalling that assemblages are produced through
the interactionsof constituent parts, but exceed the
sum of those parts, we can see how emergence is
the key to understanding how assemblages seem
to take on the status of something new and unpre-
dicted vis-a-vis what was ‘there’ prior to emer-
gence. DeLanda (2011) offers many examples
of emergence: the development of life from non-
life, the origins of language, the rise of archaic
states. In each case, pre-existing components
interacted in contingent ways that produced a new
assemblage.
Therefore, assemblages are emergent wholes
defined by their properties, tendencies, and capa-
cities. Properties refer to actualized features of the
assemblage. In geopolitical terms,wemight think
of a diplomatic service: a country either does or
does not have an embassy within a foreign coun-
try. This is a property of that state assemblage.
Capacities, by contrast, may be actual or virtual
because they refer to a set of outcomes rooted in
the properties of both that diplomatic service and
the other assemblages withwhich that diplomatic
service is interacting: ‘Thus, while properties can
be specified without reference to anything else
capacities to affect must always be thought in
relation to capacities to be affected’ (DeLanda,
2011: 4). Can the embassy produce the desired
outcome?This depends, crucially, not only on the
properties of the embassybut on the other govern-
ment. This relative openness of capacities in rela-
tion to properties is what enables a materialism
without determinism. Of course, just because the
capacities are nearly infinite for any given assem-
blage does not mean that they are all equally
likely.Hereweencounter tendencies. Tendencies
are discovered via mapping the structure of a
multidimensional ‘possibility space’. Indeed,
complexity theory has grown in part because of
the possibility of new computing technologies
to simulate many possible interactions and map
these possibility spaces in a way that is not
particularly amenable to geopolitics. However,
recall that the nature of complexity theory is that
these relations among components are qualitative
in nature; there is plenty of room for geopolitical
methodologies to analyze these possibility spaces
without attempting to quantify all of the
dimensions:
Even without quantitative information [about all
the dimensions] we can get a sense of the qualita-
tive characteristics of a landscape: whether it has
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a single global optimum or many local optima, for
example, or whether the neighborhood of those
singularities is smooth or rugged. (DeLanda,
2011: 51)
What is needed, then, is an understanding of
how these possibility spaces might inform our
understandings of geopolitical assemblages and
their (in)stability over time. Connolly (2010:
157) argues that this understanding can be culti-
vated; referencing the aforementioned 2003
invasion of Iraq, he notes that:
many thoughtful people brought experience and
sensitivity to bear on the situation before the inva-
sion, reading signs, gauging potentialities in a
volatile situation, sensing how immense the suf-
fering could be, and how difficult it would be to
change course once an invasion was launched . . .
They had a sense of the human predicament and the
dangers of overreaching, and also understood how
inaction is not a real possibility at pivotalmoments.
They poured a degree ofmodesty into thosemodels
of the masterful political agent, the consummate
market, andwarriors of unlimitedmilitary prowess.
(Connolly, 2010: 157)
In a sense, these ‘seers’ (Connolly’s term) are
open to the potentialities found in any moment;
they effectively intuit the possibility space from
the affective relations in which they are
participating.
Possibility spaces are abstract topological
spaces existing in multiple dimensions. Each
dimension is an axis on which the assemblage
can vary, reflecting the various capacities of its
component parts or of neighboring assemblages.
Possibility spaces are structured by the ways in
which properties of components or assemblages
tend to interact. In these spaces, singularities
emerge as points which tend to actualize more
often. The degree to which the assemblage, as
actualized in any given place or time, is near to
these attractors indicates how territorialized the
assemblage is, how coherent and stable it appears
to us. The ability to vary many of these dimen-
sions and still produce a similar assemblage
gives the impression of permanence; borrowing
from ecological theory, this characteristic has
been referred to as ‘resilience’ and imported into
the social sciences (Walker and Cooper, 2011;
Welsh, 2013).
If there are multiple attractors near one
another, we grow accustomed to thinking of the
assemblage as having multiple states of being
(Jones, 2009). An example from the physical
sciences is phase change; water can take liquid,
solid, or gaseous forms simply by changing the
amount of energy in the assemblage. In geopoli-
tics, we might think of a multiparty democracy
(party 1/party 2/party 3), the global economy
(steady growth/boom/recession), and an individ-
ual’s affective state (fearful/resentful/generous/
etc.) as having this kind of possibility space. In
contrast, a possibility space with a single attrac-
tor will seem to have only one general state, but
has nowhere to go should the outcomes of inter-
actions vary widely from the norm. In this case
the assemblage might either dissipate entirely
or will appear to do so before reterritorializing
around a new attractor. A geopolitical example
might be the state ideal. Murphy (1996), among
others, has noted the emergence and dominance
of the state as a form of political organization.
Even in periods of extreme pressure on political
organization, recent examples such as the disin-
tegration of Yugoslavia and the collapse of the
Somali state point to dissipation followed by the
reterritorialization of new state assemblages that
are distinct from their antecedents but still huddle
around that attractor in topological space. As Jef-
frey (2013) notes, the state is a seductive idea that
continually relies on the improvised performance
of various actors to provide an illusion of coher-
ence that stretches across these moments of
rupture.
More conventionally, we can imagine the
‘tipping point’ between attractors as a threshold
which can cause the entire assemblage to reor-
der itself, should enough outliers fall on the far
side of it. We can see this in natural selection,
when a new species breaks away from the old.
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If it seems dangerous to be citing Darwin in a
paper on geopolitics, it need not. This is not
an argument for the survival of the fittest, which
assumes a system at equilibrium in which the
fittest emerges. Rather, it is a case of under-
standing individual assemblages as historical
in nature, shaped by past experiences but always
vulnerable to crisis. Resilience, like a compo-
nent’s capabilities, can only be understood in
relation to a particular event. The biosphere of
the dinosaurs was radically transformed not
because the dinosaurs were not fit, but because
an event literally impacted their ecological
assemblage. Here the non-human agency of the
asteroid pushed the system over a threshold into
a new basin of attraction. The lesson for geo-
politics is a simple one: assemblages appear
stable and coherent until they no longer do. Just
as few predicted the fall of the Soviet Union or
the 11 September 2001 attacks (Cudworth and
Hobden, 2011), complex systems are prone to
non-linear outcomes. The emergent effects of
the assemblage are too complex and excessive
to predict (although social science has often
staked its reputation on its ability to unpick this
‘mess’ – see Law, 2004). I now turn to a final
geopolitical topic to which complexity theory
speaks: the subject.
IV Bodies politic and the subject
of geopolitics
Given the historical tendency of geopolitics to
emphasize macro-scale phenomena, and its rela-
tively recent attempt to engage with micro-scale
phenomena (Dittmer and Gray, 2010), theories
of the subject have not been at the forefront of
geopolitical scholarship. However, complexity
theory raises questions about the subject to which
geopolitics is well positioned to contribute. Pro-
tevi (2009: 33) defines subjectivity through his
concept of ‘bodies politic’: ‘meant to capture the
emergent – that is, the embodied and embedded –
character of subjectivity: the production, bypass-
ing, and surpassing of subjectivity in the
imbrications of somatic and social systems’.
Bodies politic are always the layered, emergent
product of assemblage, and therefore the perpe-
tually changing intersection of multiple tempor-
alities – the sensibilities derived from human
evolution, the past experiences of the individu-
ated body, and the near-simultaneous affects and
discourses of the immediate moment (Connolly,
2002). Bodies politic engage in political cogni-
tion, which is when they engage in political
evaluation of their situation from the perspective
of certain racial, class-based, ethnic, national,
and gender identities, as produced by now well-
documented processes of subjectification (Fou-
cault, 1977). Critical geopolitics has done an
excellent job of documenting the role of
academics, statespersons, and producers of pop-
ular culture in disseminating narratives that
produce geopolitical subject positions (Dittmer,
2013; Dodds, 1994; Ingram, 2001; Kuus, 2011;
Mu¨ller, 2011; Sharp, 2000). What it has not been
very good at is tying these subject positions, and
the political cognition that they enable, to politi-
cal affect:
The affective response patterns of bodies politic,
which are triggered by sensation and play a key
role in on-the-spot political cognition, are condi-
tioned by our moods and personalities, which are
themselves formed by the repetition of episodes
of affective cognition. (Protevi, 2009: 35)
These political affects shape our reaction to
events, but equally as reflexive agents we can
work on changing our reactions, what Connolly
(2002) refers to as micropolitics.
Importantly, Protevi goes beyond individual
(or first-order) bodies politic to imagine
second-order bodies politic, or assemblages that
incorporate multiple human bodies (and non-
human elements) in a political community,
which can exist over a range of different tem-
poralities: for example, the very short-term
‘conversation’, the relatively short-term ‘protest
group’, or the relatively long-term ‘nation’ (see
also Shaw, 2012).
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A second-order body politic has a physiology,
as it regulates material flows (1) among its
members . . . and (2) between itself (its soma as
marked by its functional border) and its
milieu . . . This regulation of group system
dynamics can be seen as construction of a virtual
repertoire, modeled as the production of an attrac-
tor layout and affectively experienced as the
background affect or mood of the group. A
second-order body politic can also be studied psy-
chologically, as it regulates intersomatic affective
cognition, the emotional and meaningful inter-
changes (1) among its members and (2) between
their collective affective cognition and that of
other bodies politic, at either personal, group, or
civic compositional scales. In other words, groups
have characteristic ways – a limited virtual reper-
toire – of making sense of what happens, on the
basis of which decisions take place as actualiza-
tions or selections from that repertoire. (Protevi,
2009: 38–39)
As constituent parts of these second-order bodies
politic, individuals typically have little control
over the collective’s action, but the collective’s
action owes something to the agency of the
first-order bodies politic composing it (Davies,
2012). Further, the emergent effect of the interac-
tions among the first-order bodies politic (and
other non-human components) can be a collec-
tive subject. Geopolitically, we might think of
examples such as a military unit, united through
embodied routines and affects, surmounting
problems for which it may not have prepared.
We might also consider moments when the
assemblage of a body politic (whether first- or
second-order) is pushed far from its normal
attractor in possibility space, causing the emer-
gent subject to drop out temporarily until intensi-
ties within the assemblage can return to normal.
For an individual, this might mean flying into a
rage and committing a crime of passion which
the subject cannot later recall committing. For
a group gathered in protest, this might mean a
blind panic inwhich the group flees a threat with-
out regard for those being trampled. These
withdrawals of subjectivity result in pure embo-
died affect without political cognition.
By considering our own subjectivity as not
only the emergent outcome of our own cogni-
tive and affective interactions, but also as
distributed among the various bodies politic in
which we participate, it becomes possible to
imagine a multiplicity of agencies through
which we work but which also work through
us. To take the example of the panicked mob,
it may not be that an individual within the mob
has lost her or his subjectivity, but if the larger
body politic has panicked, that panic will work
in and through the individual’s body as the indi-
vidual is swept along. In a more explicitly
geopolitical context, we can see how, for exam-
ple, the assemblage of the US state apparatus
interminably headed towards war with Iraq in
2003, despite many individuals’ rejection of the
casus belli (O´ Tuathail, 2003a). Similarly, we
can see how the emergence of drone technolo-
gies shapes the geopolitical assemblages in
which they are embedded. By making geopoliti-
cal assemblages the subject of inquiry, whether
they be individual bodies or large transnational
coalitions of states, corporations, and other
institutions, geopolitical scholars can deploy the
concepts described above to trace not only the
geopolitical becoming, but also the alternatives
that are as yet virtual but are, in Thien’s (2005)
words, ‘Almost’.
V Implications for a field
in transition
Thinking through the implications of the
approach to geopolitics that I have just outlined
is not an easy task. On the one hand, an assem-
blage/complexity approach is capable of assimi-
lating several strengths and research emphases
currently occupying critical geopolitics. For
instance, work in critical geopolitics that empha-
sizes representation and narrative can be under-
stood in terms of the (de)territorialization and
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(de)coding of assemblages. This entails an
ontological shift for some scholars who consid-
ered themselves ardent constructivists, but it is a
shift thatmaintains a substantial role for discourse
in geopolitics. Part of this critical realist commit-
ment to materiality (i.e. there is a posthuman
reality unfolding, even if we lack the ability
objectively to know and represent it) enables
greater attention to embodiment, performance,
and affect than has heretofore been popular in
critical geopolitics (excepting, of course, work
in feminist geopolitics). Therefore, assemblage/
complexity theory offers away to integrate awide
range of tensions already extantwithin the critical
geopolitical project. But it doesmore than that. In
a world negotiating geopolitical challenges
linked to disease (Ingram, 2008), disaster (Le
Billon and Waizenegger, 2007), climate change
(Dittmer et al., 2011), and shifts in the broader
biosphere (Dalby, 2007), increasingly attention
to the biological/environmental/material is a pre-
requisite for engagement on issues of the day.
So how are these engagements to unfold?
In the remainder of this concluding section I
would like to raise, and certainly not conclusively
answer, two issues related to conducting geopoli-
tical scholarship in this vein. The first issue
related to geopolitics of assemblage is methodo-
logical.How to study assemblages?While the flat
ontology of assemblages provides many entry
points to a given assemblage, it can be difficult
to make sense of themyriad interactions that pro-
duce it, especially given the differences in scale
and temporality that characterize the various
components and interactions (see Robbins and
Marks, 2009). Further, given the nature of assem-
blages as open systems that are always in flux,
with components adding in or dropping out over
time, it can feel impossible to know when to stop
tracing interactions. These are challenges to be
met. Yet there are advantages to be reaped.
Anderson andMcFarlane argue that assemblage:
suggests a certain ethos of engagement with the
world, one that experiments with methodological
and presentational practices in order to attend to a
lively world of differences . . . Montage, perfor-
mative methods, thick description, stories – all
have been used by geographers and others in an
attempt to be alert to processes of [assemblage].
(Anderson and McFarlane, 2011: 126)
With this ethos in mind, geopolitics can itself be
opened up to a range of new methods, as well as
new ways of presenting work derived from
methods used in the past. Leaving aside the pro-
liferation of computer-based models and simu-
lations that dominates certain fields addressing
complexity (DeLanda, 2011; Manson and
O’Sullivan, 2006), one particular way forward
might seem surprisingly retro-chic: historical
analysis (Cudworth and Hobden, 2011). This
is not simply a call for a return to historical
description, but rather a return to the archive
with new objects of study and new interpretive
resources. Recalling that each assemblage has
its own particular historical trajectory, with
regard to both its own composition and emer-
gence and its interactions with other assem-
blages, it becomes crucial to investigate the
particularities of each, to understand both pat-
terns that might be replicated through popula-
tions of assemblages and the mutant outlier
outcomes that might likewise reappear in other
places and times. Such investigations can strive
to understand the virtual forms that the assem-
blage could have taken but which were never
actualized (Day, 2010; Warf, 2002). In short,
historical analysis can enable a tracing of the
possibility spaces of contemporary assem-
blages. Excavation of these lines of flight can
help us to undermine the seeming reality of
‘path dependence’ in the present. Such an his-
torical approach could be usefully married to
more contemporary research methods, such as
ethnography, interviews, and performative
research, in order to inspire these connections
between the past and the present.
The second of these issues relates to the
ethics of the posthuman and relational ontology
which I have traced, and their implications for
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geopolitical scholarship. Bennett (2010) argues
that incumbent on those engaging with the
posthuman is the necessity to cultivate our per-
ception of non-human agency. This claim dove-
tails with Connolly’s appreciation for ‘seers’,
those who can tap into virtuality in order to per-
ceive, however dimly, the shape of possibility
spaces. Cultivating these sensibilities among
scholars is not only an ethical imperative, an
element of the micropolitics that Connolly advo-
cates elsewhere (2002), but it also lays out a line
of flight – a research agenda if you will.
This is more than a reiteration of the assump-
tions of posthumanism. Rather, by making a
break with the exclusive hold of humanity on
political agency, we open ourselves up to agen-
cies unlinked to an intentional subject. Here it is
worth connecting Protevi’s concept of bodies
politic with Spinoza’s onto-ethical maxim:
When a number of bodies of the same or of differ-
ent magnitudes are constrained by others in such a
way that they are in reciprocal contact with each
other, or if they are moved with the same or differ-
ent degrees of speed in such a way that they com-
municate their motions to each other in some
fixed ratio, we shall say that those bodies are reci-
procally united to each other. We shall also say
that all such bodies simultaneously compose one
body, i.e. an individual, which is distinguished
from others by this union of bodies. (Spinoza,
2000 [1677]: 128, cited in Woodward et al.,
2010: 273)
The possibility of emergent agencies beyond the
anthropocentric notion of politics with which we
haveworkedwith for so long begs the question of
ethical responsibility, not only for our individual
roles within them, but for our relations with them
(Connolly, 2013). In a world with distributed
agency, how much responsibility can we take?
And, possibly, how can we takemore? All of this
calls into question the humanist impulse of recent
key normative stances in critical and feminist
geopolitics (Hyndman, 2010; Megoran, 2008;
see also Dalby, 2007). In order to wrestle with
the ethical implications, however, it is first
incumbent on us to trace these geopolitical
assemblages so that we can begin to understand
our roles in a more-than-human world.
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